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For organisations today, time is an important challenge. ‘Change’, ‘speed’, 
‘acceleration’, ‘flexibility’ and ‘innovation’ are all well known and obvious demands 
on organisations, and they all stress the fact that time has become a strategic 
challenge. Seen in relation to this fact it is remarkable how little organisations theory 
discusses time and conceptions of time.1 Generally we find relatively few analyses of 
organisations which explicitly focus on time in organisations. Other disciplines draw 
surprising and radical conclusions about time, e.g. high energy physics, which argues 
that before the big bang there was no time, and that time may be constructed by man.2 
However, organisations theory is not characterised by such an radical approach to 
time. In studies of organisations it is much more common to meet time as an already 
                                                 
1 One example hereof is textbooks on organisations theory, e.g. Hatch (1997). For an overview of time 
in organisations, see Hassard (1996).  
2 For an entertaining presentation hereof, cf. Foerster (1967). See also the homepage of the British high 
energy physician Julian Barbour (www.platonia.com) and his book The End of Time (2000). 
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standardised factor, which without exceptions is forced upon organisations from the 
outside. In other words: theoretical and analytical questions about how organisations 
internally construct time and what consequences it has are neglected. One may push 
this point as far as to state that organisation theory lacks a language for time, and 
hence it is blind for empirically studying time in and between organisations.  
 
This point makes Luhmann’s contribution to organisation theory relevant. In 
Luhmann’s theory of organisations we do not find time as a naturally given element. 
Organisation system are – being autopoietic systems – able to create time internally 
(Luhmann 1984: ch. 8). This theoretical point raises an important analytical 
challenge: How to analyse time? It seems to be considerably more difficult for us to 
analyse time than other sorts of order. It is relatively easy for us to understand spatial 
order, like classrooms, houses, countries or the differentiation of organisations in 
physical offices. It is also relatively easy for us to understand factual orders, such as 
differentiation of disciplines, policies, topics or the differentiation of organisations 
according to tasks or business units etc. It is also relatively easy for us to understand 
social order, such as differentiation in groups or classes or the differentiation of 
organisations in superior and inferior positions.  Compared to these examples it seems 
a greater challenge to study the temporal order of organisations. How are 
organisations differentiated temporally? This is the focus of this article.  
 
The problem of the article is: How does time become object of strategic struggles, 
when time is internalised in organisations? This problem rests on a set of hypotheses, 
which are unfolded in the analyses.3 Firstly the hypothesis that time actually is 
internalised into organisations. As mentioned above, this is not (solely) a theoretical 
argument, but also a question which are to be studied empirically. Secondly the 
hypothesis that internalisation of time into organisations opens for the creation of 
more times in the organisation. We may also say that organisations become 
polychronic. This means that organisations are not only differentiated according to 
tasks or units, but also in more times. Thirdly, the hypothesis that when organisations 
become polychronic, time becomes strategified. This means that strategies do not only 
take place within given understandings of time. Rather, the understandings of time 
                                                 
3 The hypotheses are, in other words, not formulated with a view to falsification.  
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becomes on object of struggle, time and differences of time is shaped strategically etc. 
Fourthly the hypotheses that when time becomes strategified, future becomes 
increasingly important.  
 
Below I unfold these four hypotheses by analysing EUs organisation over time. More 
specifically I analyse the Community, i.e. the community which was established in 
1958 as the European Economic Community, which later became the European 
Community, and which today is a part of the EU as one of the three pillars of the 
Union. This Community has since it was founded had as its probably most important 
aim to establish a common market between the member states. It is this creation of a 
common market which serves as leitmotif in my reconstruction of the temporal 
organisation of the Community.  
 
In the article I first give a brief theoretical discussion, second I draw some analytical 
consequences here from, and with this set off I present my historical analysis of the 
creation of the common market by the Community. The historical analysis falls in 
three phases, and is followed by the conclusion of the article.  
Time in Luhmann’s theory of organisation 
As autopoietic systems, organisations are conceived as cognitively open but 
operatively closed. Being cognitively open means that an organisation can observe 
itself and its environment. Being operatively closed means that all operations – all 
what the system is and does – are operations of the system itself, and that the system 
creates its operations by its own operations. In a temporal perspective it is decisive to 
note, that these operations have a momentaneous character: They have no duration. 
Operations are ‘once-off’ events. They happen and disappear again. In this sense they 
are not subject to change (Luhmann 1984: kap. 9). Because all the time happen and 
disappear, an autopoietic system is ceaselessly thrown into discontinuation. For the 
system to achieve duration, it is forced to recreate itself with new operations again 
and again. This theoretical starting point can roughly be summarised by saying that 
‘operations operate’. The is not ‘somebody’ that operates or anything that operates 
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prior to the system. The system is solely ‘its’ operations; it is not prior to the 
operations, but is recreated every instant by its operations.4  
 
The operations in focus here are operations of observation. The operations enables the 
system to observe (end thereby its cognitive openness). However, the operation itself 
cannot be observed. Operations are not observable. The means that any analysis of 
autopoietic system are reconstructions, and for such a reconstruction it is decisive 
what assumptions are made about the operations of the system. Because the 
operations cannot be observed, these are necessarily assumptions or theoretical 
decisions.  Luhmann makes the theoretical decision to observe social systems as 
communication systems. This means communication is social and vice versa. This 
decision may of course be topic of discussion. For the cause of argument in this 
article, however, it suffices to note that the ‘formula’ of autopoiesis may be 
summarized: Communication communicates. There is, in other words, not somebody 
communicating prior to the system, and systems do not communicate with one-
another. Rather, socials systems are nothing but communication which communicates. 
When it comes to organisations, Luhmann makes the decision to observe 
organisations as decision-communication. Thereby the ‘formula’ for organisations as 
autopoietic systems may be summarized: Decisions decide. Organisations are not 
about somebody deciding something, but rather that the system decides. Organisation 
systems do not exist prior to their decisions, but are recreated every instant in their 
deciding (Luhmann 1988). Organisation systems do only exist in the instant, and are 
forced to produce (new) decisions in order to achieve duration. The starting point is 
discontinuity. Continuity (and thereby also: Change) are a result of the decision 
activity of the system.  
 
The statement that ’decisions decide’ has the paradoxical result, that organisation 
systems only exist in the moment, but that this moment is unobservable (Moe 2001). 
The fundamental discontinuity of systems forces the observer of systems to 
reconstruct. But the same fundamental discontinuity also opens the issue of how time 
is constructed internally in systems: The system does not have any past. Neither does 
it have any future. All it has is a present (Luhmann 2000: chapter 5), and in this 
                                                 
4 For a criticism of Luhmann’s theory with a special view at time, cf Kastl (1998). 
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present it may imagine pasts and futures, it may produce experiences and 
expectations, etc. We may, in other words, observe how organisations create time 
while they create themselves. We may reconstruct how the times of organisations are 
created by a distinction between past and future, set by the organisation. We can 
analyse how this distinction between past and future changes over time, how it is 
repeated and change from one moment to the next. But at the very same time we are 
barred from getting access to the moment, to the decision communication as 
operation. Even though the distinction between past and future is set in a ‘now’, then 
this ‘now’ disappears when we analyse it as a distinction between past and present. 
The moment is only described by what it is not, namely past and future.  
Strategy of analysis 
With discontinuous operations – temporal atoms – as starting point, past and future 
does not have any firmness or stability, but are recreated every now. This means, 
unsurprisingly, that past and future become plural, and this may be analysed by 
distinguishing between modalities of time (Luhmann 1982). Let me use ‘future’ as an 
example. Taking into account that future is multiple, it is too unprecise to talk about 
‘future’. We have to indicate (where and) when this future is observed: Was is the 
future, as it looked yesterday, is it the future as I looks today, or is it the future as it 
may look tomorrow? These futures show various modalities of time, namely past 
future (the future as it looked yesterday), present future (the future as it looks today), 
and future future (the future as it may look tomorrow). We may also wish to 
distinguish between how we expect now that a future point in time will look (i.e. 
present future), and how we think, that a future ‘now’ will look, when it is observed at 
this future point in time (future present). Accordingly, we can also distinguish 
between present pasts and past presents.  
 
Modalities of time are in various ways relevant for the decisions of organisations. An 
organisation may e.g. decide upon a vision to follow (i.e. present future), and it may 
make plans and budgets, and thereby orient itself towards a future present, i.e. try to 
set specific conditions for decisions in the future. The distinctions between modalities 
of time enable us to analyse organisations with focus on time. This is to say that 
modalities of time and systems theory provide a language for analysing organisations 
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with a focus on time, how they differentiate, who is a member of the organisation and 
under what conditions etc.  
 
The temporal differentiation of organisations also raises the question of how various 
times and decisions are coupled. We can distinguish between couplings which are 
primarily sequential or primarily simultaneous.  A sequential order is for instants the 
cooking of potatoes: First the potatoes are washed, then cooked and then peeled. A 
simultaneous order is for instants the cooking of a meal: Simultaneous potatoes are 
cooked and a beef is barbequed. Simultaneous and sequential events are hence well 
known. In connection to organisations, it is however remarkable that the sequential 
and the simultaneous often play a role at the same time. When cooking is organised in 
a restaurant, we will often see that potatoes are washed simultaneous with potatoes are 
being peeled. Simultaneous sequentiality is, in other words, a relatively common 
phenomenon. However, observing from the point of view of autopoietic organisation 
theory, we see the unlikelihood of achieving simultaneous sequentiality.  It is unlikely 
because decisions are momentaneous events. Due to decisions being taken and 
disappearing again in the same moment, a decision cannot force itself as a frame of 
reference neither on later decisions (because at a later point in time, the previous 
decision is gone), nor on contemporary decisions (because the decisions are taken at 
the same time).  
 
With these concepts as an analytic, I will in the next section descibe the Community 
with focus on how the market is observed by the community. I will focus on how 
temporal horizons are set in regards to the market, how the Community observes itself 
and on how the common marked is to be achieved using sequentiality, simultaneity 
and simultaneous sequentiality.   
The construction of a common European market5 
Based on this brief introduction, I will describe how the Community as an 
organisation system has changed over time, from what I term ’the conditioned 
Community’, via what I term ’the goal-oriented Community’, to what I term ’the 
strategic community’. Each of these forms, are closely associated with an 
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understanding of the market. The story, I unfold, is also a story about how the 
understanding of market changes from the naturally given market, via the politically 
organised market, to the transnationally negotiated market. These markets have each 
their temporality and have each their temporal consequences for the Community.  
The naturally given market and the conditioned Community 
The Community was established when the Treaty of Rome entered into force in 
1958.6 And with the Treaty of Rome there was also set a specific understanding of 
market as well as Community. One of the main points in the following is, that during 
this period the Community is not yet an autopoietic organisation system. The 
Community is namely not yet selfreferential and selfcreating, but a hetero-referential 
maschine created by eksternal communication (Kommission der Europäischen 
Ökonomischen Gemeinschaft 1958;Kommission der Europäischen Ökonomischen 
Gemeinschaft 1959;Kommission der Europäischen Ökonomischen Gemeinschaft 
1960;Kommission der Europäischen Ökonomischen Gemeinschaft 1961). 
 
For the ’market’ it was characteristic that the market was taken to be a given an well-
known thing. It was taken to be given in the sense that it was a ‘spontaneous order’ 
which would appear, if only this was not hindered politically. One may also say that 
the market already was present as a potential. More precisely, one may say that on 
one hand, the market is a present order (the market is created spontaneous in the 
moment), and on the other hand that the market is a naturally given entity, with a 
nature which does not change over time. In other words, the market is a transhistorical 
entity, with a timeless existence. In this view the market was seen as a detemporalised 
order, which has the character of an eternal momentaneousnes. In line with the time-
modalities outlined above, we may talk about a present eternal?  
 
This understanding of the market had several consequences for the organisation of the 
Community. Firstly, this understanding of market was a precondition for the 
encompassing plan in the Treaty of Rome, of how the market was to be realised. This 
market understanding made is possible quite specifically to point out in what ways the 
                                                                                                                                            
5 This history of the Community is highly condensed. For a more elaborate presentation, cf. Frankel 
(2001). 
6 Traktat af 25. marts 1957 om oprettelse af det Europæiske økonomiske Fællesskab. 
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member states hindered the spontaneous emergence of the market. On this 
background a relatively detailed plan was made of the steps to be taken over the 
following 12 years in order to realise a common market. This plan, entailed in the 
Treaty of Rome, was anchored in calendar time, that is, in an externally given time, 
standardised and quantified in days, weeks and years. Thereby, precise deadlines for 
the removal of barriers to the market could be set. The plan should establish specific 
future situations and conditions. The plan was a technique to establish future present.   
 
More specifically, the plan was to be realised by a Community, which was build by 
conditional programmes. A conditional programme is a ‘if-then’ programme, i.e. a 
specification of what is to happen if certain factors occur (Luhmann 1993). The 
programme specifies a response to a stimulus. Characterised by conditional 
programmes, the Community is not yet an autopoietically closed and selfreferential 
organisation system, but rather a hetero-referential machine, with a future existence is 
programmed and conditioned by rules and legal acts. As a machine it is uncertain 
whether the future is a horizon for the Community. The future is more likely to be 
described as structurally fixed events, which together give a tact for the establishing 
of the common market. Thereby the plan also provides a point of reference by which 
it can be measured whether the realisation of the common market is behind or ahead 
of schedule or is to be accelerated (Rådet 1960).  
 
The plan indicates that time is external in relation to the Community. The Community 
does not yet create its own time. The Community is externally created, and set in an 
externally created time. The same goes for the ends of the Community: The 
realisation of the market. This end is a precondition for the Community, which it is 
not for the Community to discuss. The Community is, like the market, 
detemporalised. But where the market could be characterised by eternal 
momentaneousnes, we can rather characterise the formal organisation of the 
Community as standardised present. Standards, which describe which decisions, are 
to be taken when.  
 
As a whole the plan is conditioned by these two forms of detemporalisation, and the 
plan is set in work by coupling these two forms with calendar time. It is in other 
words an a-political project, which takes place in non-strategified time. However, this 
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analysis is not without exceptions: At certain instances, the Community is 
temporalised, e.g. when it is stated that the aim of the Community is to create ‘an ever 
closer union’ between the people of Europe. In this way a present future is presented 
in the preamble of the Treaty, a vision which distances itself from a Europe in the 
past, segmented in states in mutual war. In this vision of the preamble a political time 
occurs, and the detemporal Community and establishing of a common market is set 
into this political time.  
 
The plan by which the common market is to be achieved, implies that sequentiality is 
decisive: It is decided what steps are to be taken when and – more importantly – also 
in what sequence they are to be taken. There is, of course, some degree of 
simultaneity, primarily because several, parallel sequences with the aim of 
establishing the common market. However, each sequence is to run strictly sequential. 
It is, in other words, not an option to take more steps in one sequel at the same time. 
The main reason for this is that ‘the large decision’, the Treaty of Rome, is to function 
as frame for all subsequent decisions. It is also decisive that the Commission, in 
specific areas, can establish frames for – subsequent – decisions by the member states.  
 
Summarizing, the Community, as established by the Treaty of Rome in 1958, is 
characterised by linear sequentiality. Below I have sought to illustrate this. 
 
  Decision   Implementation 
 
The decision is the Treaty of Rome, as it is decided by the states, which when the 
Treaty entered into force, became member states. By implementation is indicated that 
the same states are to take certain steps, or that the Commission is to take certain 
decisions. In so far as the Treaty becomes a frame for other decisions, it does so only 
because the Treaty is actualised again and again in subsequent decisions.  
 
In the next period we will see how the understanding of market changes, how the 
Community becomes selfreferentially closed, and what consequences this has for the 
temporality of market and Community.  
’the goal-oriented Community’ politically organised market 
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The politically organised market and the intentional 
Community (1962+) 
In this period the Community appears as an autopoietic organisation system; the 
Community becomes selvreferential, and it creates its own time. This can be seen in 
the changes of the understanding of the market. The market is no longer a general 
thing, but becomes specific, also in regards to its temporality. In this understanding of 
the market, a market is not the same at all times. ‘Markets’ are observed as specific 
national markets of the member states. Differences between the national markets are 
observed as a problem, because differences hinder the free movement, and hence 
hinder the common market. The national markets differ due to differences between 
the regulations of the member states. This new understanding of markets has 
fundamental consequences for the Community. It alters the relation the between 
politics and markets: Markets are no longer taken to be naturally given, but as 
politically constituted. And as markets are constituted by political decisions, the task 
of the Community turns becomes a task of organising the market. This is to say that it 
is not enough to remove barriers of the member states; it is also required that the 
Community, by taking political decisions, constitute the common market. Thereby 
every part of the market becomes specific – the market is specified by the decisions 
which organises the market.  
 
Thereby the temporality of the market also changes. Now the market appears as a 
general vision – which on could call an utopia (Luhmann 1982) – about the general 
free movement. However, to realise this free movement requires several less general 
visions about how the market is to be constituted in one specific area. In other words, 
the establishing of the common market requires visions for a common environmental 
policy, for a common regulation of automobiles, for a common regulation of 
packaging, construction products etc. Hereby ‘the market’ becomes the common 
denomination of a long list of present futures. However, at the same time concrete 
regulation, stemming from these present futures, is to be initiated, decided upon and 
implemented. In order to give the common market a concrete form, several present 
futures are to result in planning and regulation. In the language of the Community, 
harmonisation is required, which is to say that an unknown number of harmonising 
directives are to be adopted in order to establish the common market.  
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The understanding of the market implies three times: A utopian vision about free 
movement (present future), several more specific present futures for a not specified 
list of policy areas, and finally the realisation of plans for regulation as future 
presents.  
 
This change in understanding of the markets has the decisive consequence that the 
Community becomes intentional: It formulates ends, and selects appropriate means. 
The market is no longer simply one aim or end, but a several ends. As opposed to the 
general end ‘free movement’, we are now observing ends which are decided by the 
Community internally. The conditional programmes of the Treaty become 
insufficient, and to a large degree also absolved by means-ends programmes.  
 
The linear sequentiality of the previous period is in this period absolved by a circular 
sequentiality. Thereby I wish to indicate that the sequences of initiative-decision-
implementation result in decisions, which serve as occasion for new initiatives etc. 
The new understanding of market implies that the Community needs to make a vast 
amount of decisions which were not taken into account when the Treaty was made. 
These decisions requires that the Commission makes use of its monopoly of initiative, 
and in most cases it also requires (unanimous) adoption by the Council, and 
subsequent implementation. This situation opens up for new sequences of decisions, 
and these sequences serve as occasion for (previous) decisions to be considered and 
revised. Thereby the ‘circle closes’, and we may illustrate the decision making with 
the following policy-circle model:7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For an analysis of the EU, based on this model, cf. Højbjerg (2000). 
Decision 
InitiativeImplemen-
tation 
Christian Frankel: The future of the future?  13 
 
 
 
The conditional programmes, and their giving tact to sequences of decisions, are 
increasingly succeeded by the pulse given to the circular sequentiality by ends-means 
programmes. It is the circular sequentiality which shall make the three temporalities 
of the market meet, make the utopian vision into more specific visions, and make 
these visions into future presents, which offers private companies and other actors on 
the market frames of action, which offers them a ‘level playing field’.  
 
Thereby it is also opened up for each policy area to create its own time. 
Environmental policy may produce time horizons different to that of competition 
policy. The Community becomes polychron. Hence the common vision gets the 
important function to coordinate these temporalities in one, common time horizon.  
 
The intentionality of the Community indicates that the Community becomes an 
operatively closed system. In this closure, the utopian vision of the market plays a 
decisive role. This becomes clear in a Commission memorandum from 1962.8 In this 
memorandum it is stated, that the Treaty of Rome completely entails the conditions of 
its own realisation. Hereby the system refers to itself as its own foundation, which 
indicates that the communication of the system is produced according to system 
internal conditions. The system gains autonomy. Thereby is also said that whenever 
lacks are demonstrated – such as the plan for the establishing of a common market in 
the Treaty – then these lacks become occasion for the system to take more decisions 
to ‘repair’ the lacks; the system starts to re-interpret its own foundation.  
  
During the 1970s, the self-reference is unfolded with more consequences. As it 
seemingly becomes an evermore encompassing problem to establish the common 
market, it is stated that the Community, under the (then) current organisation, is 
unable to make the appropriate amount of decisions to realise the market, and thereby 
unable to pursue the process which is seen as the raison d’etre of the Community 
                                                 
8 Kommissionen 1962 KOM(62) 300: Memorandum der Kommission zum Aktionsprogramm der 
Gemeinschaft für die zweite Stufe, Bruxelles, den 24.10.1962. 
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(Kommissionen for de Europæiske Fællesskaber 1977). Thereby yet a step is taken, 
strengthening the self-reference of the Community: Revisions of the Treaty becomes a 
theme. Hence it is no longer the Treaty, which entails the conditions of its own 
realisation, but the Community which entails the conditions for the realisation of its 
own present future, and such a realisation may imply that the formal foundation of the 
Community must undergo a revision.9 
 
At this stage it may already be clear that the operative closure of the Community 
implies that the informal organisation wins importance as compared to the formal 
organisation. Increasingly, the formal organisation is evaluated as observed from the 
informal organisation. And as suggested above, it also implies that future gains 
importance. However, at the same time the history of the Community also gains 
importance, amongst others because the decisions of the Community create a history, 
on which new decisions are based. The self-referentiality of the Community also 
implies that the Community observes its own past. It is observed how conditional 
programmes characterised the Community in the past, and this is observed as a 
decisive problem which is to be solved by setting ends and selecting means to realise 
these ends.  
 
During this period the members of the Community are primarily the formal 
institutions – the Council, the Parliament, the Economic and Social Council etc. – 
with the member states primarily represented in the Council. However, the autopoietic 
closure of the system has the effect that the member states occur both as members in 
the system and as environment. As members they take part in taking decisions. As 
environment they are object of observation of the Community.  
 
The boundaries of the system change character. The intentional Community sets its 
boundaries itself, and does so closely linked to the ends, i.e. by the horizon of the 
future. As the member states constitute markets, it is only natural that the member 
states and the institutions of the Community have decision competencies.  
 
                                                 
9 Such a treaty revision marks the start of the third period. 
Christian Frankel: The future of the future?  15 
Thereby new problems appear. As a result of both markets and member states being 
temporal, the problem of different speeds appear (Kommissionen for de Europæiske 
Fællesskaber 1979). The market is faster than the Community (and political 
organisation more generally). The solution to this problem is acceleration. As in the 
first period we find acceleration. However, in the first period the measure of 
acceleration was a given plan which regularised the future. In this period the measure 
of acceleration is the temporality of the market, a temporality which by and large is 
unknown to politics, and which primarily is observed by the fact that politics is late.  
 
For the Community, however, it seems difficult to catch up on the market due to the 
member states. They are observed as a hindrance to acceleration. In many instances, 
the Commission cannot find support for considering the proposals it forwards to the 
Council.  
 
The market is observed in two ways compared to organisation, namely as (un-
organised) environment and as (organised) system. On one hand this understanding of 
market implies that markets do only exist because they are constituted politically, i.e. 
by being created politically (hence politics and markets are necessarily 
contemporary). On the other hand, however, markets are always ahead and require 
new political decisions.   
 
Acceleration is primarily sought to be achieved by differentiation of the organisation. 
One example hereof is comitology, i.e. new sequences in the decision process, which 
makes it possible for the Council to adopt frame-decisions and leave it to the 
Commission, in cooperation with the member states, to fill out these frames. Thereby 
the time of the organisation is differentiated in the time of the Council and the time of 
comitology, and thereby also differentiated in procedures with each its own time 
horizon and work rhythm. The various decision procedures are, however, still seen as 
part of one, overarching decision procedure.  
 
Such differentiations do not solve the problem that the Community temporarily is in a 
tension between the member states (which are to slow) and the market (which is to 
fast). During the 1970s this temporal difference is observed as a fundamental 
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problem, as a risk for the Community to be pulled apart.10 The pulse, given to the 
Community by the circular sequentiality, is fundamentally challenged: It can only be 
to slow (in relation to the market), and it can never (in relation to politics) get as fast 
as required. There is seemingly an unsolvable time differences in play, which 
challenges the existence of the Community. On this background are Treaty revisions 
more regular theme. And thereby we have reached the start of the next period.  
The transnationally negotiated market and the strategic 
community (1985+)  
The beginning of this period is marked by the negotiation and ratification of a Treaty 
revision, namely the so-called ’Single European Act’ (entered into force in 1987). On 
of the decisive changes in this revision was to change the decision procedure of the 
Community in such a way that harmonisation directives could be adopted, even when 
unanimity could not be reached in the Council. Previously, unanimity was the rule, 
and this rule was observed as an important reason for the time difference which 
challenged the Community.  
 
However, the problem of the time difference is more encompassing than a view at the 
treaty revision makes it appear. The problem cannot be solved alone by accelerating 
the circular sequential decision procedure of the Community. This point is underlined 
by the fact that the understanding of market changes in the early 1980s. This change 
implies that not only rules from formally political institutions are observed as 
constituting markets, but also private rules. This implies that the constitution of the 
common market becomes yet more encompassing. Thereby the establishing of a 
common market is challenged in two ways. Firstly, the ongoing harmonisation of the 
Community only harmonises how the member states organise the market, and not 
how the market is organised by private political market organisation. The result 
hereof is that harmonisation directives alone will never suffice for the establishing of 
a common market because there ongoing will be private political market organisation 
in each member state, which will hinder the common market. Secondly, a new 
                                                 
10 Specifically the so-called information procedure, which was adopted in the early 1980s, reflecs this 
problem. Cf. Forslag til Rådets beslutning om en informationsprocedure med hensyn til tekniske 
standarder og forskrifter (OJ C 253 p. 2-6, udgivet den 1.10.1980) samt Rådets direktiv af 28. marts 
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temporal difference is observed as a problem: The private political market 
organisation is observed at considerably faster than the political market organisation. 
Therefore it is impossible for the Community to make decisions in the required speed.  
 
The lack of competencies, which the observation of private, technical barriers to trade 
imposes on the system, has the result that the boundary of the system is observed as a 
problem. The solution to this problem is that the boundary of the system is redrawn in 
such a way that the system becomes much more encompassing. Such a redrawing 
takes place with the so-called new approach to technical harmonisation and 
standards11. This approach entails cooperation with both national and Euopean 
technical standards organisations. These organisations are given the task to adopt 
technical standards, which make the legal acts of the Community more concrete. 
Thereby the Community decrease the number of legal acts, required to realise the 
internal market. The so-called ‘new approach directives’ are framework directives, 
which require that the ends, formulated in the directive, are made concrete by 
European Technical standards. The new approach does, in other words, turn the 
observed lack into a strategic advantage. The Community internalises decision 
making procedures with a temporality, different from what it already had. The 
Community becomes increasingly polychronic.  
 
The strategic Community is an answer to the problem of lacking competencies. The 
external boundary is redrawn, with the result that technical standardisation 
organisations become member. Parallel to this ‘enlargement’ also the form of 
rationality of the Community is changed. Besides conditional programmes and 
means-end programmes, the Community now also encompasses strategy programmes. 
Strategy programmes do not primarily focus on means and end, but on problems, and 
how these problems can be solved. Thereby it becomes possible to compare means-
end relations. Various and different means and ends may be used to solve the same 
problem. In other words: The strategy programmes are reflexive programmes, able to 
observe the equivalence of means-end relations. This reflexivity also indicates a 
                                                                                                                                            
1983 om en informationsprocedure med hensyn til tekniske standarder og forskrifter (OJ L 109/8, 
offentliggjort den 26.4.1983) 
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higher degree of autonomy of the system: The system can reflect upon how its 
boundary to the environment is established. However, the strategic Community is not 
only characterised by a larger number of members, but also by a less obvious and 
more fluctuating membership. The external boundary cannot be established once and 
for all, but becomes an ongoing problem. It is not given naturally or formally who is a 
member and who is not. It is e.g. noted that ‘standardisation is an advantage for all of 
us, and the public authorities have by using it to such a large extend made the 
economic actors responsible for their own destiny’ (own translation of Nicolas & 
Repussard 1995). The system becomes a community of destiny; the common destiny 
and responsibility for the establishing of the market is decisive for the drawing of the 
system boundary.  
 
Hereby present future becomes decisive for the system boundary: It is the future 
market which is the turning point when the question of membership or exclusion of 
the Community is raised. 
 
The decision making becomes simultaneous sequential: There are more, parallel 
decision processes. The new approach seems at a first glance to be sequential: First 
we have the initiative to make a legal act, then the legal act is adopted, and 
subsequently it is to be concretised by technical standards. Such a sequentiality is, of 
course, by no means impossible. However, it is not necessary. The decision making is 
now characterised by more decision making forums, which take own initiatives, make 
own decisions and own implementation. There are many examples of technical 
standards being decided and implemented, which concretise a directive, while the 
directive is still about to be adopted. The multiplication of decision forums has as a 
consequence that the establishing of the market can take place simultaneous and 
sequential and the same time. Thereby it becomes impossible to say in what 
arrangement initiative, decision and implementation will take place. Simultaneous 
sequentiality implies that frames, and that which is to fill out the frames, may be 
decided upon at the same time. This may be illustrated as follows. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
11 Rådet. 1985. “Resolution af 7. maj 1985 om en ny metode i forbindelse med teknisk harmonisering 
og standarder (85/C 136/01).” EF-Tidende . The new approach is discussed and elaborated by the 
Commission in several documents (1990; 1994; 2000a; 2000b). 
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     Initiative 
     Decision 
     Implementation 
 
Simultaneous sequentiality implies that both structure and proces are challenged as 
means to ensure coordination. Simultaneity implies that the frame does not 
necessarily constitute a frame, because decisions taken at the same time cannot 
constitute a frame for one another. Furthermore, the simultaneity implies that it is not 
necessarily a process, because a process requires decisions which follow specific, 
subsequent deicisions. Neither do we have a situation in which a common end 
coordinates the decisions. We rather find a situation in which there are conditions for 
– simultaneous and sequential – struggles about what ends to pursue with what means. 
In a temporal perspective this implies that the polychrony of the Community becomes 
radicalised. As opposed to the polychrony of we found in the previous period, it is in 
this period questionable whether there at all is any common vision for the various 
temporalities of the Community. Each sequence constitutes a time of its own.  
 
What is then left to constitute the unity of the organisation? Maybe nothing. However, 
the above mentioned community of destiny does most likely play a crucial role. The 
various parts of the establishing of the market relate to a common future, and this 
future is decisive for the establishing of the market. Visions of the future become a 
crucial form of coordination, both as present future and as future future. It seems to be 
important to shape visions about how actors at the market in the future are to take 
responsibilities for the market. Examples hereof is the green paper on corporate social 
responsibility and the white paper on ’Governance in the European Union’.12 Present 
future and future future has become crucial battlefields in drawing the Community. 
Thereby the founding treaties have become just one among more instruments in the 
battle about the future, notably because also the treaties are interpreted in the light of 
the future.13 
                                                 
12 Cf. KOM(2001) 366 and KOM(2001) 428 respectively. 
13 A well-known example hereof is the crucial role of teleological interpretation in EC law. 
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Conclusion 
The article has demonstrated how Luhmann’s theory of organisation, based in 
discontinuity, opens op for analyses of the temporality of organisations. This raises 
some theoretical questions, empirical points and analytical challenges.  
 
Theoretically we may note that the ‘now’ never becomes accessible for system 
theoretical observations, and that this is not the ambition of the theory. If the ‘now’ is 
to be grasped, it is more appropriate to refer to e.g. radical phenomenology.14 For 
systems theory the now can only be an object of theoretical decisions. This has been 
demonstrated with Luhmann’s theory of organisation, which defines organisations 
operations as decision operations. Thereby a theoretical question is opened, namely of 
how the problem of temporality can be characterised specifically in relation to 
decisions (as opposed to other forms of operations, e.g. payments or rulings).  
 
Empirically the analysis has opened up for insights, which demonstrate how time can 
be decisive for organisations. The strategification of time implies that time has 
become a battlefield today. In a time where the enlargement of the EU is a central, 
political issue, it is important to stress, that the membership of the EU not primarily is 
a formal questions, but first and foremost a question of becoming a part of the 
common future and take responsibility for the realisation of the visions of the EU. 
Such ongoing ‘accession negotiations’ do not only take place between the EU and 
candidate countries, but at many levels and in many forums and in relation to many 
actors.  
 
Seen in relation to the Danish debate on the EU, the analysis highlights a crucial 
distance to the obsession with evaluating EU in its present form. Seen from the 
perspective of the Community, the most important question is not how the EU may be 
evaluated in terms of democracy, competitiveness or legality with focus on its present 
past. For the Community, neither the past nor the present is the major source of 
legitimacy, but rather the future.  In regards to the debate in Denmark this implies that 
if the debate primarily focuses on the past and the present, influence is lost on the 
                                                 
14 Cf. e.g Kirkeby/Fuglsang (2002). 
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important issues in the Community (and the EU more generally), which are decided 
and coordinated through visions.  
 
In the same line of thought it becomes a crucial question decisions are coordinated. 
How to coordinate simultaneous sequentiality? Simultaneous sequentiality is one of 
the strengths of organisations. This goes for the restaurant, which simultaneously 
washes and peels potatoes, for the conveyor belt and for almost any other industrial 
production.  However, the analysis of the Community stresses how this problem is 
radicalised to the improbable in Luhmann’s theory of organisation. This is so because 
the focus is on communication as the temporal atom of the theory. Thereby one gain 
of the theory is exactly to demonstrate the improbability of things, we otherwise take 
for granted. This is furthermore stressed in the analysis by the political challenges 
raised by simultaneous sequentiality. Simultaneous sequentiality challenges 
fundamentally the procedural order of decision making in the Community. At the 
same time the analysis highlights that present future and future future gets a more 
important function in regards to coordinating the simultaneity of sequential decisions.  
 
Analytically a host of questions can be raised on the background of this article. With 
the words of Goethe, one may note that temporal analysis ‘is easy, however, that 
which is easy is difficult’. It is a challenge to create a language fit to describe the 
temporality of organisations. More specifically a host of exciting analytical challenges 
are raised for the temporal gaze, such as how power emerges for a temporal gaze. The 
power literature has e.g. focused on ‘structural power’ (e.g. Christensen/Jensen 2001), 
i.e. power which is invisible because it takes the form of ’taken for granted’ 
structures. Compared hereto, ‘process’ is the category for open, not restrained 
possibilities. However, the temporal analysis may highlight the importance of 
‘process power’. When something is designated as a process, it becomes irreversible. 
Whereas structures are reversible – they can be changed and re-established – 
processes are irreversible. To designate something as a process is also to note that it 
cannot be turned back. This is a description common in regards to the EU. As 
opposed to this, the temporal gaze may open for new possibilities by pointing at the 
reversibility of structure.  
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